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Are interpersonal affordances a distinct type of affordance, and if so, what is it that
differentiates them from other kinds of affordances? In this paper, I show that a hard
distinction between interpersonal affordances and other affordances is warranted and
ethically important. The enactivist theory of participatory sense-making demonstrates that
there is a difference in coupling between agent-environment and agent-agent interactions,
and these differences in coupling provide a basis for distinguishing between the perception
of environmental and interpersonal affordances. Building further on this foundation for
understanding interpersonal affordances, I argue that in line with some enactivist work
on social cognition, interpersonal affordances ought to be considered as those that are
afforded by agents and are recognized as such. Given this distinction, I also make the
point that because our social conventions establish persons as more than mere agents,
the direct perception of interpersonal affordances may also involve seeing others as
embodied selves. Distinguishing between types of affordances thus also matters ethically:
there can be harms done when an agent is not perceived as an agent, and there can
be harms done when an agent is not perceived as a self.
Keywords: social affordances, interpersonal affordances, direct perception, social cognition, agency, selfhood

INTRODUCTION
Are ecological psychology and enactivism committed to a difference between our perception
of the environment and our perception of other agents? Drawing from James Gibson’s work
(J. Gibson, 1979/2015) on perception, contemporary enactivism and ecological psychology both
use the theory of affordances or perceived possibilities for interaction. Affordances are neither
properties of the environment nor the agent, but are co-constituted in the agent-environment
relationship, given the agent’s values, abilities (Chemero, 2003), and skills (van Dijk and Rietveld, 2017)
as the agent actively explores her world (J. Gibson, 1979/2015). Ecological psychology is largely
built around the notion of affordances as the main objects of perception, while in enactivism
affordances have played a more subsidiary and contentious role.
Increasingly, enactivists are using the language of affordances in their explanatory frameworks
(see, e.g., Gallagher, 2008, 2017; Di Paolo et al., 2017). Enactivism and ecological psychology
share a number of theoretical commitments, and many see them as kindred approaches to
cognition. Both reject the received view of cognition as internal, computational, and representational.
1
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Both propose that we see cognition as an active process
constituted in the relationship between organism and
environment. Both argue that perception is intersubjectively
developed (Gallagher, 2008; De Jaegher et al., 2016), learned
(E. Gibson, 1963), and/or socially mediated (Heft, 2007). These
should be thought of as broad agreements in spirit, though,
rather than precise overlaps – the approaches are sisters,
not twins.
Given that the ecological approach relies on James Gibson’s
theory of direct perception (J. Gibson, 1972/2002), we should
understand affordances not as inferred through our perception
of the environment, but as directly perceived. We see an apple
as edible, rather than post-perceptually inferring that it is edible
(for example, Nanay, 2011). Further, while apples can offer
the possibility of sustenance or afford being eaten, this might
only be perceived as a relevant affordance if an agent is actively
searching for something to eat; if I were looking for something
to hold down a paper that was in danger of blowing away,
an apple might instead afford the possibility of serving that
purpose for me.
The social contributions to affordance perception have been
widely discussed and debated in the ecological psychology
literature (e.g., Reed, 1991; Costall, 1995, 2012; Heft, 2007).
Other people, though, are not apples, and how we perceive
the affordances offered by other agents is a much smaller
subset of this literature. The contemporary hybrid theory of
ecological-enactivism has offered some headway on how
we might approach uniquely social affordances (Rietveld, 2008;
Rietveld et al., 2017), holding that social affordances offer
possibilities for social interaction. However, ecological-enactivists
have also maintained that there is an equivalence between our
perception of environmental affordances and social affordances
(Rietveld et al., 2013, 2017). This work on social affordances
has been valuable for explaining how we might both
pre-reflectively experience and conscientiously shape our
interactive spaces.
Here, though, I propose that in bringing together ecological
and enactivist views on social interactions, we need to maintain
a finer-grained distinction between environmental affordances
that offer opportunities for socializing, such as public spaces,
and those offered by agents themselves. That is, I will argue
that the perception of interpersonal affordances (Trierweiler
and Donovan, 1994; Richardson et al., 2007; Fiebich, 2014),
defined as opportunities afforded by other agents, is indeed
different from the perception of environmental affordances,
given what enactivism has provided on the unique nature of
agent-agent coupling.
Given the role that intersubjectivity plays in the enactive
framework, and the importance of joint sense-making in
interaction (De Jaegher, 2013a,b), distinguishing between
affordances in agent-environment and agent-agent relationships
ought to be taken as both explanatorily and ethically relevant
due to the differences in cognitive activities and types of
coupling. Put simply, the perception of interpersonal affordances
is uniquely interactive. While this is a foundational point
for enactivist accounts of social cognition (Gallagher, 2008;
De Jaegher, 2009), I argue here that this ought to be equally
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

applicable when accounting for the perception of affordances
offered by other agents.
Importantly, this distinction is also ethically relevant. For
human forms of life, the mutual attribution of agency that
happens in social interactions involves many layers. One of
these, I argue, is that we perceive other humans as selves.
Selves are scaffolded by social convention and practice and
are developed in relation with others (Kyselo, 2014). Here,
using Maiese’s “life-shaping” thesis of selfhood (Maiese, 2019),
I show the importance of perceiving both agency and selfhood
in interactions and, conversely, demonstrate the harm that can
be done by refusing to recognize another as an agent or as
a self. This advances the discussion on the ethical dimensions
of affordances in interaction and helps illustrate the damage
that is done when one is perceived as affording possibilities
for interaction that deny their agency or aspects of their selfhood.

SOCIAL AFFORDANCES AND
INTERPERSONAL AFFORDANCES
The social aspects of affordances have been detailed in ecological
psychology by those such as Heft (2007), who argues that the
perception of affordances is in all ways social. That is, Heft
argues that both the ontogeny and phylogeny of how we come
to perceive affordances, for humans, is socially developed
through niche construction and the influence of culture through
the constructed ecological niche (see also: McGann, 2014 on
intersubjectivity, E. Gibson, 1963 on perceptual learning, and
Ramstead et al., 2016 on cultural affordances)1. The intersubjective
development of affordance perception applies to both
environmental affordances and the account of interpersonal
affordances that I will offer here.
As Rietveld et al. (2017, p. 300) define them, social affordances
are “possibilities for social interaction or sociability provided
by the environment.” They have been defined elsewhere even
more broadly:
“Social and communicative affordances that reflect the
meaning of human activity for other humans
(cf. McArthur and Baron, 1983; Reed, 1988). These
include not only the affordances of symbolic behavior
such as human conversation and writing (Dent, in press)
but also the affordances of nonsymbolic activity such as
facial expressions (Alley, 1988; Buck, 1988), gesture
(Tomasello, 1988; Van Acker and Valenti, 1989), body
postures and movements (Runeson and Frykholm,
1983), tone of voice (Walker, 1982; Walker-Andrews,
1986), and the direction of gaze (orienting; Scaife and
Bruner, 1975; Butterworth and Cochran, 1980) that
provide information about the actor as well as about
Eleanor Gibson is often overlooked and under-cited, and oftentimes a citation
to “Gibson” is assumed to be a reference to another well-known Gibson.
Following the convention introduced by Miguel Segundo-Ortin, I cite Eleanor
Gibson as “E. Gibson” and James Gibson as “J. Gibson” to bring more attention
to her unique contributions.
1
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other aspects of the environment. The symbolic
behaviors (language) are entirely conventional and
culture-specific, whereas the nonsymbolic are only
partly so” (Loveland, 1991, p. 101).

other architectural interventions to offer options for activities
conducive to social interactions in public spaces. In this sense,
sociability could also be afforded anywhere that people tend
to have social interactions, such as coffee shops, parks, the
grocery store check-out lane, or even the sidewalk, though all
of this would be heavily dependent on sociocultural norms
and practices.
Because sociability and social interactions are quite different,
it is important to distinguish these further. Affording sociability
might apply to an area or an artifact (such as an app), in
that it can lead to a social interaction, but these affordances
themselves are not socially interactive in an interpersonal
sense. A sociability affordance might be one that affords an
interaction conducive space or can facilitate or lead to an
interaction. These might often be a pre-cursor to a social
interaction but are neither necessary nor sufficient to lead to
an interaction. More specific claims about what is afforded
by certain types of social affordances, or when sociability is
afforded, should be made cautiously though. What one feels
is an “interaction conducive space” would of course
be dependent on culture, social position, and identity. There
may be gender, race, neurodiversity, disability-related, or
historical issues or dynamics that would influence whether
spaces are perceived as hostile, dangerous, or uncomfortable
for some and welcoming or comfortable for others
(De Jaegher, 2013a,b; Heras-Escribano, 2019, Ch. 7; Jurgens, 2020).
It should also be stressed that, in the terms of the social
cognition literature, interpersonal affordances should not be taken
to imply a Theory of Mind, which is an inference about or
simulation of the mental state of the other. A Theory of Mind
is built on the idea that we are at a remove from the mental
state of the other in social interactions, and that we use
simulation (implicit mental simulation, e.g., Goldman and
Sripada, 2005, or mirror neuron systems, e.g., Gallese, 2005)
or inference (e.g., some kind of implicit or explicit theory
about others’ minds, e.g., Gopnik and Wellman, 1992) to explain
how we as spectators (Schilbach et al., 2013) come to know
the other’s mental state (their intentions, emotions, etc.). Rather,
perceiving an interpersonal affordance should be thought of
as phenomenologically immediate, as with James Gibson’s theory
of the direct perception of affordances (J. Gibson, 1979/2015).
Direct perception is the basis of interaction theory, the
theory of social cognition proposed by Gallagher (2008). It
might be helpful to draw a similarity between Gallagher’s direct
perception theory and how we ought to understand interpersonal
affordances. This enactivist conception of direct perception is
built on the idea that cognition is fundamentally embodied
and action-oriented. As such, it is not the case that mental
states are locked away inside the mind of the other. In direct
perception, we simply see affective states and goal-oriented
actions as such, with no need for inference. Having moved
away from the input-model of perception, there is no need
for an inference or for simulation in order to see a motion
of a hand toward a cup as reaching for the cup. Likewise,
we see a friend as excited without need for inference or
attribution (Varga, 2018). Reflexively, we might make this
attribution, but in most cases this is because that is how

Loveland’s conception incorporates a list of affordances that
might be related to acts of socializing or communication.
Loveland’s list is meant to be more limited than, for example,
saying that affordances can be canonical, a term used by Costall
(2012) to refer to the way that affordances can be specific to
socio-cultural practices. That is, Costall uses this term to point
out that some affordances are available only because those
perceiving them have learned certain ways of engaging with
the environment or certain meanings of items through social
means. An example of this is a recycling bin. This only affords
the recycling of an item if one has been raised in a social
environment where recycling is a norm or somehow otherwise
knows about the social convention of recycling.
Gallagher and Ransom (2016) use the term “social affordances”
in an even more limited sense in discussing the social affordances
provided by social media. As many of our social interactions
do not take place in person, that a certain website or app
affords sociability could mean many things. For example, an
app can be used for facilitating meet-ups in the sense of one
creating or responding to a social media event for an upcoming
gathering or collective action. It could also mean facilitating
direct exchange between agents in a virtual space, such as with
a messaging app. This usage of the term is also becoming
widespread in areas that study human-technology interaction
and mediation, such as networking technology (e.g., Bradner, 2001)
and social robotics (e.g., Paauwe et al., 2015).
Social affordances have also been discussed in some detail
by ecological-enactivists. The hybrid theory of ecologicalenactivism (Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014) has brought together
both the ecological and enactive approaches in their proposal
of the Skilled Intentionality Framework (SIF; van Dijk and
Rietveld, 2017). The SIF incorporates the “lived perspective of
a skilled individual” as integral for understanding how it is
that we perceive relevant affordances (van Dijk and Rietveld,
2017, p. 3). The development of the skills for being attuned
to relevant affordances for the agent can be thought of as
“multiple bodily states of action readinesss reciprocally coupled
to the landscape of affordances, in the sense that these states
of action readiness self-organize and shape the selective openness
to the landscape of affordances” (van Dijk and Rietveld, 2017,
p. 8). Though we might think of skill in the sense of expertise,
this includes any embodied or pre-reflexive skills or capacities
for navigating the world. Skilled intentionality can be as simple
as selectively perceiving a mug handle as graspable when one
is heading to the coffee pot for a refill. Through our skills
and habits of coupling, we are selectively open to the relevant
affordances of the environment for the task(s) we are undertaking.
In their discussion of social affordances, Rietveld et al. (2017)
offer a number of concrete suggestions for improving sociability
in the sense of providing spaces where people from disparate
backgrounds or with very different interests might be inclined
to come together. Their suggestions include park planning and
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org
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we perceived the action. And while we might sometimes use
an inferential process to try to figure out what someone is
doing or feeling, this is when something is complex or confusing.
It is the exception, not the rule.
Interaction theory incorporates affordance perception into the
explanation of how it is that we directly perceive these mental
states. This is explained by Gallagher and Varga (2014, p. 189):

on each other for their generation and their realization as a
network, (ii) constitute the system as a unity in whatever
domain they exist, and (iii) determine a domain of possible
interactions with the environment.” The autonomous system
thus creates the conditions of its own persistence, and the
capacities of the system establish the ways in which it can
interact with the world.
Maintaining these processes requires that the system be open
to the world in ways that enable the system to continue
these maintenance processes. Being open to the world in
ways that are appropriate for the organism is possible because,
in addition to having the capacities to act, organisms are
able to make sense of the world in some way. Sense-making
(Varela et al., 1991) involves an organism actively exploring
a world through the perception of what might be helpful
for maintaining organismic integrity and what can hinder or
harm, and acting accordingly. Or, more concisely, it is “the
creation and appreciation of meaning in interaction with the
world” (De Jaegher, 2013b, p. 6).
In the autopoietic tradition of enactivism, an agent can
be defined as “an autonomous system capable of adaptively
regulating its coupling with the environment according to the
norms established by its own viability conditions” (Di Paolo
et al., 2017, p. 127). This is not to say that agency itself is
attributable to the organism, as enactivism holds that cognition
is a relational process rather than involving the internal processing
of environmental information. On the enactive account, “perhaps
agency is not a property that belongs exclusively to a system
but is a property of a relation between that system and its
surroundings. And this relation is variable” (Di Paolo et al.,
2017, p. 110). Thus while we might call an organism an agent,
agency itself would be the relational process of selectively
attuning one’s actions in accordance with the environment and
others. The relational account of agency is variable, in that
there is an interactional asymmetry between the organism and
the environment, and the relationship fluctuates given the
organism’s needs and perhaps environmental demands. There
can be a difference in the balance of agency in the agentenvironment relationship given the particulars of a current
circumstance. For instance, the balance of agency in the agentenvironment relationship will be different when I am looking
in the fridge for a midnight snack versus when I am fleeing
a park due to a sudden high-wind storm.
While these provide a picture of the most minimal processes
of life and cognition, these notions scale up to more complex
behaviors and systems of organization. For social organisms,
the agential process of active attunement does not simply mean
that the environment includes others but that others contribute
to agential processes and interactions with others can be their
own autonomous processes. These interpersonal and social
dynamics are captured in the theory of participatory
sense-making, as introduced by De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007).
De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007, p. 497) define participatory
sense-making as “the coordination of intentional activity in
interaction, whereby individual sense-making processes are
affected and new domains of social sense-making can
be generated that were not available to each individual on

“According to [interaction theory] and the direct
perception hypothesis, social perception is enactive.
That is, my perception of your action is already formed
in terms of how I might respond to your action. I see
your action, not as a fact that needs to be interpreted in
terms of your mental states, but as a situated opportunity
or affordance for my own action in response. The
intentions that I can see in your movements appear to
me as logically or semantically continuous with my own,
or discontinuous, in support or in opposition to my task,
as encouraging or discouraging, as having potential for
(further) interaction or as something I want to turn and
walk away from.”
While this is an excellent example of a fruitful integration
of affordances with enactive approaches to social perception,
interaction theory has been criticized for not being interactive
enough (De Jaegher, 2009). In the following section, I will
turn to the theory of participatory sense-making (De Jaegher
and Di Paolo, 2007) to provide a more detailed argument,
based in interaction, for holding that the perception of
interpersonal affordances is different from the perception of
environmental (and social or sociability) affordances due to
differences in coupling.

ENACTIVE AUTONOMY AND
INTERACTION
Interpersonal affordances offer opportunities for interaction
with another agent and, therefore differ in definition from
environmental or sociability affordances. The participatory
sense-making framework, grounded in autopoietic enactivism,
provides a further way of distinguishing interpersonal affordances
from other types in terms of affording possibilities specific to
a social interaction. That is, interpersonal affordances are offered
in an autonomous interactive process that emerges in the
coupling of agents.
The enactivist notion of autonomy is based on the most
fundamental of organismic processes: self-maintenance and selfproduction. These self-organizing processes form the foundation
for the autopoietic approach to cognition (Maturana and Varela,
1980). An organism must maintain itself and its boundaries
through a network of biological processes while at the same
time being selectively open to the world in order to take in
from the environment what it needs to sustain its existence.
Summarizing Varela (1979), Thompson (2007, p. 44) describes
the autopoietic view as holding that processes constituting the
autonomous organization of a system: “(i) recursively depend
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org
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her own.” The interaction is mutually co-constituted, co-regulated,
and co-sustained by autonomous agents, who are recursively
shaped within the interaction they are sustaining. In participatory
sense-making, we have the coupling of autonomous systems
that, through that coupling, create an autonomous interaction
that involves a precarious balance between participants in order
to be maintained.
Being able to be involved in processes of mutual creation
of social meaning is important to self-production and
maintenance within the intersubjective sphere. It is through
these kinds of interactions that the normativity of social practices
in the social niche are created, shaped, and changed. For human
forms of life, maintaining autonomy involves more than
organismic processes of self-production and maintenance in
a purely bodily sense. De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007, p. 493)
give a brief description of the criteria for establishing that an
interaction is social, based on this interactive notion of
emergent autonomy:

the other is regulated as listener, offering a chuckle or gasp
at the appropriate times. While the regulator and regulated
roles flow back and forth, neither party’s autonomy is ever
harmfully compromised in this idealized example. Both are
perceived by the other as autonomous agents within the
interaction, both are involved in establishing the norms of
that interaction, and regulatory roles can be seen as a matter
of request, not force.
Now, consider that affordances are possibilities for action
(or interaction). Rietveld et al. (2013, 2017) want to avoid a
hard distinction between the perception of social and
environmental affordances by appealing to the similarities in
how we perceive them as embodied agents. Pointing to the
Skilled Intentionality Framework, they note that the skill of
picking out relevant affordances generates “readiness of the
affordance-related ability” (Rietveld, 2008). Whether a relevant
affordance is environmental or social, “starting from bodily
or skilled intentionality, our perspective avoids an artificial
separation between social cognition and nonsocial engagements
with the environment” (Rietveld et al., 2013).
This is unproblematic if we are talking about the difference
between environmental and social (in the sense of sociability)
affordances. However, if we are talking about interpersonal
affordances, those afforded by or in interaction with others,
the lack of distinction becomes an issue. First, interpersonal
affordances are not given in the relationship between an agent
and an environment but in the relationship between agents.
De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007) argue that these are different
types of coupling (see also De Jaegher, 2009). The divide
between environmental affordances and interpersonal affordances
is not artificial – in the first case, you have a mere coupling,
and in the latter case, there is a mutually regulated coupling:

“Social interaction is the regulated coupling between at
least two autonomous agents, where the regulation is
aimed at aspects of the coupling itself so that it constitutes
an emergent autonomous organization in the domain
of relational dynamics, without destroying in the process
the autonomy of the agents involved (though the latter’s
scope can be augmented or reduced).”
In participatory sense-making, preservation of the autonomy
of the involved agents involves a mutual recognition of the
subjecthood of the other. This recognition is meant in an
immediate fashion – it is not that one decides the other is a
subject, but that they are already seen as “a subject, not an
object” (McGann and De Jaegher, 2009, p. 428; also see Schilbach
et al., 2013). To this, I add that this similarly also involves
the direct perception of the other as an agent. There is a
direct perception of the agency and subjectivity of the other.
The interaction process can and does involve asymmetries
of autonomy in order to maintain itself. Agency is recognized,
while autonomy fluctuates. This is because the interaction
process also involves ebbs and flows of mutual regulation (Di
Paolo et al., 2018). In an interaction, the regulating role of
the processes of mutual sense-making should, ideally, flow back
and forth between agents in order to co-constitute the interactive
process. This will involve coordination in multiple dimensions.
For instance, two people may be engaged in a conversation
at a coffee shop. There will be bodily coordination in the
sense that they pre-reflectively align their postures (Richardson
et al., 2005), and they will perhaps be pre-reflectively balancing
their emotional states in response to the other (Hatfield et al.,
1993; Kiverstein, 2015). Both participants may pre-reflectively
compromise in order to attune to the comportment of the
other. One may follow the other in leaning forward when
exchanging a particularly juicy bit of gossip or leaning back
when talking about how busy their workweek has been. One
may have a long story to share, and there may be an asymmetry
in regulating the flow of utterances in the interaction – one
person is regulating through their continued utterances, while
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

“Thus, social interaction has two characteristics:
(1) there is a coupling, which is regulated so as to
generate and maintain an identity in the relational
domain. Thus, the resulting relational dynamics are
autonomous in the strict sense of precarious operational
closure … and define events and processes as either
internal or external to the interaction. And (2) the
individuals involved are and remain autonomous as
interactors” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, p. 493).
The skill of being attuned to relevant affordances should
also include a sensitivity to the possibility that one can engage
in a social interaction. This would often involve directly perceiving
one as an agent able to enter into an autonomous interaction,
due to the intertwining of perceiving-as and action-readiness.
Perception (on both ecological and enactive accounts) is an
active process of looking for action possibilities in the
environment, so the perception of interpersonal affordances
will often involve specifically looking for affordances provided
by an agent. It might be relevant that one is a specific agent
(when one has an appointment to meet with a friend), or it
might be relevant that one is an adult agent more generally
(if I am on the street looking for someone to speak with so
I can ask for directions), but nonetheless, I am actively perceiving
5
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an agent, and the perception of agency is intertwined with
my readiness to respond to a perceived interpersonal affordance.
There are many fairly innocuous reasons that an agent’s
autonomy might be compromised in an interaction: we can
imagine a caregiver giving a child a stern talking-to for
misbehavior, for example.
There are also ways in which sociocultural position, norms,
and power dynamics can limit the speech affordances available
in some interactions or what a speaker affords to others with
their words (Ayala, 2016). A member of a marginalized group,
for example, may perceive opportunities to interact differently
(or perceive less of them), might find that their words have
less impact or that they solicit less attention in interaction
with a member of a dominant social group. This could
be considered a compromise of autonomy and/or contributor
to regulation role imbalance, in that it narrows the possibilities
for engaging in collaborative sense-making. There also exist
more extreme imbalances in autonomy, in the case that one
is not treated as a subject and as an agent. These can constitute
a grievous devaluation or dehumanization, such as occurs in
torture or warfare, where one is treated as non-human (animalistic
dehumanization) or as not possessing agency at all (mechanistic
dehumanization; Haslam, 2006; Gallagher and Varga, 2014).
Failures to recognize a person as an agent are not only
something that happens in these extreme cases though. This
frequently happens more subtly in everyday interactions, when
failing to recognize one’s agency by perceiving them as an
object or tool. Further, there are other harms of recognition,
such as failing to recognize another’s social selfhood in interaction.
In the final section, I will expand on the ways that neglecting
or refusing to perceive one as a self can be an ethical issue.
First, though, in the following section, I will describe Maiese’s
enactive notion of selfhood (Maiese, 2019) so that we can
also look at the importance of perceiving a persisting self in
human interactions.

a life-shaping thesis of selfhood, grounded in autopoietic
enactivism, which like enactive accounts of agency is nuanced
and multi-dimensional. I will use the life-shaping thesis here
for demonstrating the importance of selfhood in human
interactions, in perceiving interpersonal affordances and
understanding the ethical aspects of recognizing each other
as more than mere agents.
Kyselo’s main concern is that we need a unifying theory
of self “as a whole, something that can count as a distinguishable
unit of explanation and eventually help to interrelate different
aspects of the self ” (Kyselo, 2014, p. 2), and that can be used
to guide work in the cognitive sciences. She argues that the
social self is “never fully separable from the social environment,
but instead determined precisely in terms of the types of social
interactions and relations of which it is, at the same time, a
part” (Kyselo, 2014, p. 12). Kyselo’s answer to the problem of
unification distinguishes between two possible answers cognitive
scientists might give in trying to locate the self. The first is
the idea that what individuates the self is the living body,
which she says entails that the social is non-constitutive of
the self. The second is to individuate the self as a coherent
unity according to the social dimension. She argues in favor
of this second option, holding that the social is constitutive
of the self.
To think of how the social self is determined in social
interactions, we can consider the recursivity in participatory
sense-making, where the autonomous agents both shape and
are shaped by their social interaction. McGann and De Jaegher
(2009, p. 433) say of this process that “[c]ulture transforms
our body from a physical mode of cognition, action, and
perception to a social one where action can be shared, values
coordinated. It is a dramatic alchemy that occurs through
participatory sense-making and the acknowledgement of the
agency of another. The implications of this fact for the enactive
approach cannot be overstressed.” Thinking about social selves
and the ethical dimensions of interactions is one way of taking
up these implications.
However, Maiese (2019) points out that the theory of
participatory sense-making only goes so far as to say that
social interactions shape the participants, not determine them.
Instead, Maiese offers a “life-shaping thesis” of selfhood, in
which the self is individuated by the body while being shaped
by the social, to account for the unification of the self over
time. While Kyselo (2014) claims that the self is individuated
via social relations, rather than via the body, Maiese (2019,
p. 364) bases selfhood in the autonomous organization of a
system, which requires that an organism individuates itself as
a closed network of systems of self-maintenance. She holds
that the individuated self “is fully embodied, and that the
various dimensions of mindedness—that is to say, our desires,
feelings, emotions, sense perceptions, memories, thoughts,
intentional actions, etc.—are all partially determined, or shaped,
by the social world” (also see Scheman, 1983). For humans,
the intersubjective scale of agency involves individuating oneself
in the social realm, but this is scaffolded by the ongoing bodily
processes by which we are able to maintain our individuation
over time. So while the self is shaped by the social, this does

ENACTIVE AND EMBODIED SELFHOOD
For human forms of life, agency alone is often not going to
be a robust enough notion to capture what it is we might
want recognized in social interactions. We are also selves,
persisting over time, with particular lived experiences, identities,
and ways of being in the world. How it is that we can say
a “self ” exists, is individuated, and persists over time though
is a matter of much contention. The enactive account provides
a multi-dimensional and nuanced approach to agency – there
are several domains of agency that enable and constrain each
other through their overlap of processes and sensorimotor
schemes, such as organismic agency (discussed in section
“Enactive Autonomy and Interaction”), sensorimotor agency
(Di Paolo et al., 2017), and linguistic agency (Cuffari et al.,
2015; Di Paolo et al., 2018). The complexity of these latter
kinds of agency, their intersubjective development, and their
ubiquity in our social niche enables the formation of what
Kyselo (2014) has called the socially individuated self. Building
on the strengths of Kyselo’s work, Maiese (2019) has proposed
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not root the persistence conditions of the self in the social.
Rather, the social would be one domain of embodiment of
the organismically individuated self, which would enable and
constrain other dimensions of embodiment.
Maiese’s proposal of the life-shaping thesis (Maiese, 2019)
provides a robust enactivist notion of the self that does not
make us choose between the self of cognitive science and the
social self. The enactive account holds that cognition is constituted
by a number of nested processes, involving body, brain, and
world – and for humans and other social organisms, shaped
intersubjectively. Though Kyselo frames the discussion of the
self in terms of a context/constitution dichotomy, the project
of deciding between the social as contextual or constitutive
of the self is perhaps a bit misguided in terms of metaphysical
presuppositions. Enactivism, as a non-reductive, process-oriented,
intersubjective, and multiscale account, can accommodate the
social as both contextual and constitutive of the self in various
ways, as Maiese shows. Further, individuation – differentiating
between self and environment – has been held as one of the
main characteristics of agency for minimal autopoietic systems
(Di Paolo, 2005; Barandiaran et al., 2009). It is not quite clear
why another sense of individuation would be necessary. On
this, Maiese (2019, p. 364, emphasis added) says:

these identities shape how we extend ourselves (through our
aims, plans, and goals) into the future (Brancazio and SegundoOrtin, 2020). Relatedly, it is only because we can act out of
accordance with social expectations and demands that we have
the means for transformative change of the social. Second,
because it preserves agency and autonomy, the life-shaping
thesis can be productively integrated with the enactive theories
of participatory sense-making and direct perception in
interaction. The self is engaged in social interactions in which
it can be shaped or influenced, but it is not fully determined
within the sphere of these acts, thus fundamentally preserving
the autonomy of the embodied agent. Maiese (2019, p. 363)
voices similar concerns about Kyselo’s determination of the
self in the social and the implications for compatibility with
participatory sense-making:

“This distinction between components that constitute
the living system and elements that form its environment
grounds not only biological identity, but also the identity
of the self. Indeed, just as a living system should
be individuated according to this form or organization,
the self (or what might described as the human mode
of life) should be individuated according to its
characteristic form or organization, rather than the
energetic or relational material that ensures its
continued existence.”

It is also important to note that by being accommodating
to varying socioculturally situated notions of self, this does
not necessarily mean that individuals have a self in the narrative
or reflective sense. In other words, I believe we can take
Maiese’s notion of selfhood as not implying that the social
self is necessarily unified, or unified in any particular way,
apart from the embodied sense2. A persistent theme in feminist
theory and critical race theory is multiplicitous selves and
identities. Given the numerous communities that one may
navigate in their social terrain, one may have the experience
of enacting, adopting, and being treated as more than one
social self – especially in the case that one belongs to one or
multiple marginalized groups (e.g., Anzaldúa, 1987; Harris,
1990; Wing, 1990; Ortega, 2001; Barvosa, 2008). In fact, in
this work, it is oftentimes embodied persistence through multiple
social worlds, or the phenomenological mine-ness of experience
given through embodied persistence and subjectivity, that is
said to ground individuation or persistence conditions through
which the agent is able to enact numerous selves in the social
sphere (Alcoff, 2006). Locating the individuation and persistence
of selfhood in the “self-organizing” of autonomous systems
opens up room for an enactive approach to how it is that
selves can manifest in different ways, depending on particularities
of context, social roles and cultural knowledge, power dynamics,
marginalization and oppression, and other aspects that shape
the way that an agent will take up an interaction.

“…indeed, participatory sense-making presupposes and
requires bodily-organismic ‘selves’ who can partake in
the interaction process. Moreover, for each of these
‘selves’ to remain an autonomous interactor, it must
be possible (even if unlikely) for her to defy social
expectations, or even disengage from the social
interaction if she feels so inclined.”

Maiese seems to ground unification in both the individuating
(physical) and persisting (temporal) sense in the autonomous
processes of living systems, in line with the autopoietic notions
of individuation through self-maintenance and self-production.
The life-shaping thesis holds that the social is not constitutive
of the self, but that the self is fundamentally embedded in the
social. The self, she argues, is influenced and shaped by the
social in the sense that the social has a causal influence, is
reciprocally shaped by us through our responses or contributions
to the social, and is normative. It is normative because the
social shapes our internal norms not only through enabling
or constraining our embodied processes but also in the
contributory sense of taking part in participatory sense-making
and practices that can reinforce, shape, or transform social
norms. In this way, through social participation and self-shaping,
social normativity is recursive.
Grounding the self in this way is important for my account
for two reasons in particular. First, understanding the self as
fundamentally embodied does not allow for full determination
of what unifies the self over time in the social. To say this
is perhaps too dismissive of the first-person authority we have
on our own existential identities (Bettcher, 2009) and the way
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org

There is quite a bit of literature on narrative selfhood and the distinction
between minimal and narrative selves, which I will not be taking up here.
Maiese’s account provides a way of having a unified embodied self without
necessarily making commitments to any specific (or even unified) reflective
or narrative self (for more discussion on this distinction, see Menary, 2008;
Mackenzie, 2014, or Zahavi 2007).
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The notion of selfhood proposed by Maiese (2019) captures
the root of what is important for developing an account of
how it is that we directly perceive and selectively respond to
interpersonal affordances. On her account, the social self is
an aspect of the embedded embodied self, and the persistence
conditions of selfhood, while socially embedded, are maintained
by the embodied processes of organization rather than being
fully socially determined. The subject directly perceived in
participatory sense-making is an embodied subject embedded
in the social. Further, the account makes no general claims
about what social selfhood is and can be sensitive to the myriad
ways that sociocultural norms, practices, multiplicity, and
neurodiversity can influence self-perception and experience.

have to wait for it.” A continuous interaction offers a continuous
stream of changing interpersonal affordances – and, recursively,
engagement with these affordances changes the process
of interaction.
The participatory sense-making account provided in section
“Enactive Autonomy and Interaction” makes it clear that these
reciprocal processes often happen within an autonomous
interaction, where the interactors are involved in a shared,
co-regulated (and co-regulating) domain of sense-making. Taking
this into account, perceiving what is afforded by the other
agent can also be influenced by the perceiver’s desire to maintain
the interactive coupling. The perception of relevant interpersonal
affordances by each individual agent will involve more than
the concerns of their own self-maintenance – they include
concerns about the maintenance of the autonomous interaction
as well. Or, perhaps, the relevance of affordances will instead
be influenced by an agent’s desire to leave the interaction (so
they may begin glancing around the room, looking at their
phone, or become slow to respond to the interpersonal affordances
the other agent is offering).
As discussed above, participatory sense-making requires
seeing another as a subject. In other words, maintenance of
an autonomous interaction, or agent-agent coupling, already
presumes agency.
My claim here has been that interpersonal affordances in
participatory sense-making also involve the direct perception
of agency and, to some extent, selfhood. This, I believe, has
some ethical implications, in line with the ethical dimensions
of the Gibsonian perspective of affordance perception: “The
meaning or value of a thing consists of what it affords. What
a thing is and what it means are not separate, the former
being physical and the latter mental as we are accustomed to
believe” (J. Gibson, 1982, p. 407). If we apply this to interpersonal
affordances, we can consider how being seen as an autonomous
agent capable of entering into a participatory sense-making
process would be a valuation of our contributions to that
shared domain of sense-making. Thus, while it does not matter
to an apple whether it affords edibility to a person, it can
matter immensely whether a person is viewed as a candidate
for shared meaning-creation or shaping. The discussion of
interpersonal affordances thus must involve examining how
prejudices, power dynamics, biases, and social status influence
how one is perceived and how this affects their ability to
contribute to participatory sense-making.
On the farther end of compromises of agency in interaction,
we can think of objectification. Objectification has many aspects,
which have been detailed by Nussbaum (1995) and Langton
(2009). The most important of these aspects for understanding
the relationship between objectification and interpersonal
affordance perception is the denial of autonomy, being treated
as a tool or a means to an end and the treatment of someone
as interchangeable with objects (or fungibility) (Nussbaum, 1995),
as well as reduction to body and/or appearance (Langton, 2009).
Black feminism has long brought attention to the objectification
and dehumanization that Black women experience, especially
in terms of animalistic dehumanization and the denial of agency
(Rollins, 1985; Collins, 1986; Crenshaw, 1991). These kinds of

INTERPERSONAL AFFORDANCES
BETWEEN AGENTS AND SELVES
I will turn back now to the direct perception of agency and
selfhood in the social sphere by way of interpersonal affordances.
As discussed in section “Social Affordances and Interpersonal
Affordances,” we should take interpersonal affordances to mean
actual possibilities for interaction with an agent. An interpersonal
affordance is not perceived in the agent-environment
relationship, but is afforded by another agent (whether
intentionally or not). Interpersonal affordances are not
necessarily already part of an interaction, but they can afford
an interaction. For example, let us say that I am walking
down the street and I see a friend, who is engaged in a
conversation with someone else. I may perceive them as
affording a social interaction, though they have not actually
seen me yet – so there is no intention on their part to
interact. Conversely, in participatory sense-making, both agents
are actively affording possibilities for interaction through their
ongoing utterances, gestures, bodily and emotional coordination,
and so on. In both cases, the perception of interpersonal
affordances is not a product of the agent-environment
relationship, but of the agent-agent relationship, and involves
seeing the other as a subject.
In section “Social Affordances and Interpersonal Affordances,”
I explained that interpersonal affordances are directly perceived:
“The sight of a sad friend affords consoling him or her, a
colleague at the coffee machine solicits small talk, and an
extended hand immediately prepares the body for shaking it”
(Rietveld et al., 2013, p. 436). It is crucial to note that in this
example, the perception-as and the action-readiness are
intertwined, as with the direct perception in the interaction
theory of social cognition (see De Jaegher et al., 2010; Gallaghehr
and Varga, 2014). However, the perceiving-as in interaction is
not perception of a static state. Fiebich (2014, p. 1) makes
the point that interpersonal affordances are “perceived within
interactive reciprocal processes,” where the perceived agent is
engaged in ongoing action processes in response to the behaviors
of the other in interaction. This is also argued for by McGann
(2014, p. 26): “There is also no particular moment in time at
which perceiving is ‘complete’ because such perception always
occurs in the flow of on-going behavior – activity does not
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org
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experiences (and others, such as objectification through
fetishization) have also been discussed in trans theory, most
predominantly in the experiences of trans persons of color
(Flores et al., 2018).
Let us consider a serious case of objectification: street
harassment (which may include misogynistic, racist, ableist,
transphobic, classist, or queerphobic harassment, as well as
many intersecting combinations of these). This kind of harassment
usually involves a stranger uttering derogatory or sexual words
of phrases to an individual, though this can also take place
through (or include) stares, ogling, or physical menacing. In
describing the psychological effects of the sexual street harassment
of women, Davis (1994, p. 143) says that it “allows men to
establish the boundaries of participation in the street. …Through
street harassment, men inform women that women are public
participants only with men’s permission.” It is perhaps obvious
that the individual being harassed is not perceived by the
perpetrator as affording the kind of treatment that appropriately
acknowledges their agency and autonomy.
This is neither a social interaction nor an invitation to
create a shared domain of meaning. Objectification of this
kind, seems to be more akin to a “skill” if we are using the
Skilled Intentionality Framework (van Dijk and Rietveld, 2017).
The perpetrator views the harassed person as a relevant affordance,
not for a social interaction but for objectification
(dehumanization, denial of agency, being treated as a means
to an end, and so on). That is, given the above discussions
about direct perception in ecological and enactive approaches,
we can think of the action-readiness tied to the perception
of a marginalized agent as an opportunity to enact a skill
(explicitly or implicitly) intended to foreclose the possibility
of meaningful participation. However, we should be cautious
about going too far in explaining objectification through what
is exercised by an individual, as this places too much responsibility
on the individual perpetrator when we should also be looking
at the systemic issues and social structures that allow (or
encourage) this type of treatment to become habituated.
It may often be appropriate to objectify the local environment
as affording something for you, within reason and given
prevailing norms. It is not appropriate to perceive an agent
as offering something for you in the same way, if it constitutes
a devaluation of the person3. But even these are the situated
claims of a Western anglo philosopher – the environment/
interpersonal distinction, and appropriate attributions of agency
and autonomy in perception, may be very different in other
cultures (Kelly and Lobo, 2020), in which case we ought to
look at how affordance perception in those cultures is socially
shaped (as discussed in section “Social Affordances and
Interpersonal Affordances”) and be ready and willing to adjust
our theories about affordance perception accordingly.
We also need to take into account that, as previously discussed,
interactions do not just take place between ahistorical agents.
I have argued that participatory sense-making involves the coupling
of selves in the interaction process. This means that there is a

recognition not just of an embodied agent in the course of
interaction, but also a socially embedded agent – an agent that
has a way (or ways) of being in the world with others that
pre-exists and continues on after the interaction. I hold that
persisting embodied selfhood, as discussed by Maiese (2019), is
directly perceived rather than reflectively attributed or inferred.
While this is not the case for every interaction, I think this is
an important aspect of participatory sense-making. Seeing the
participant as an embodied, socially embedded self allows for
the coordination of expectations about shared meanings that
structure the interactive space. And in creating a shared domain
of sense-making, there are opportunities for creating and shaping
meaning for the social self that extend beyond the interaction itself.
In contrast, one who is denied aspects of their selfhood is
subject to a compromise in their autonomy in participatory
sense-making. One way this might manifest is through the
denial of interpersonal affordances to those belonging to
non-dominant or oppressed groups. Of course, while street
harassment is an obvious harm, there are more systemic and
pervasive ways in which non-dominant groups are not perceived
as full agents or selves. Speaking on the narrator of Ellison’s
Invisible Man, Charles Mills discusses the experience of this
kind of ongoing racialized objectification:
“His problem is his ‘invisibility,’ the fact that whites do
not see him, take no notice of him, not because of
physiological deficiency but because of the
psychological ‘construction of their inner eyes,’ which
conceptually erases his existence. … So his problem is
to convince them that he exists, not as a physical object,
a lower life form, a thing to be instrumentally treated,
but as a person in the same sense that they are, and
not as a means to their ends” (Mills, 1998, p. 9; quotes
from Ellison, 1952).
Another example of a more deliberate denial of selfhood
would be engaging in an interaction with a person but
consistently not using their pronouns. To do so is to perceive
one as a social self, with an autonomous identity, and then
purposefully undermine that very sense of self in the process
of interaction through the interpersonal speech affordances
offered. Insisting on denying someone’s selfhood in interaction
in this and other ways denies full entry into participatory
sense-making, as it is a forced regulation of autonomy. This
kind of harm, as a denial of selfhood and agential identity
(Barnes, 2019; Dembroff and Saint-Croix, 2019), limits an
agent’s ability to participate in the co-creation of meaning
(De Jaegher et al., 2016) in a social interaction, among causing
or perpetuating other harms.
In closing this section, I believe it is important to note
that looking at the experiences of those who have their agency
and selfhood actively denied suggests that we ought to be very
careful about what we can take for granted in enactive and
ecological approaches to social interactions and affordance
perception. While there is clearly more to discuss in regards
to the perception and denial of agency and selfhood, my
intention has been to demonstrate that the direct perception

This would not apply in cases such as stopping someone on the street to ask
the time, as this is a request for assistance, not a denial of agency.
3
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of interpersonal affordances involves the perception of agency.
I have also argued that in many forms of interaction, including
participatory sense-making, direct perception will also involve
seeing the other as a self. To not appropriately perceive these
in some cases can constitute serious harms to a person. Using
the enactive theory of participatory sense-making, I have also
shown that this can limit one’s ability to enter into processes
of meaning creation or shaping.

of particular backgrounds” (Rietveld et al., 2017, p. 303), as
Rietveld et al. have discussed, we first need to understand the
concrete particularities of bringing people together in social
spaces. In bringing together ecological and enactive approaches
to evaluating the ways in which our social institutions and
practices can be transformed, we must also actively build
resources for examining and understanding how our habits
and actions contribute to devaluation and other harms to other
agents. And by being attentive to the ways in which marginalization
and oppression structure social interactions, we can better
examine the ethical aspects of our research on interactions, as
well as practicing more ethical interactions ourselves.

CONCLUSION
As enactivism and ecological-enactivism progress in explaining
complex human realms of being, they grow increasingly concerned
with social normativity and social institutions. For example, De
Jaegher (2013b) has looked at how patriarchal and democratic
institutions can be understood through the enactive approach to
intersubjectivity. Maiese and Hanna (2019) have offered concrete
suggestions for transforming our political and social institutions
using insights from enactivism and ecological psychology. And
Rietveld et al. (2017) have brought attention to the important
challenge of adapting insights from enactive and embodied cognition
into resources for increasing social cohesion and inclusivity.
I have argued that recognition of selfhood and maintaining
a distinction between environmental affordances and interpersonal
affordances are important for these projects. On one hand,
this is explanatorily important due to the different kinds of
coupling involved. On the other hand, this distinction is important
for theorizing about the ethical and political aspects of affordances.
To say that perception of affordances is the same, whether
environmental or social, generalizes away from the concrete
realities of experience and selfhood in interaction.
If we are looking for ways to increase social cohesion
“understood as the co-existence of disparities, not the elimination
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